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Abstract: This paper focuses on the complementarity between original institutional 
economics, Mario Bunge’s framework of systemism, and the formal tools developed by 
complexity economists, especially in the context of agent-based modeling. Thereby, we 
assert that original institutional economics might profit from exploiting this 
complementarity. 
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Since their emergence, institutional economists have discussed potential philosophical 
underpinnings of institutionalist theory, as well as the appropriate role for formal modeling tools 
in economic thinking. In this paper, we use the classic methodological contributions of Gunnar 
Myrdal (1978) and Charles K. Wilber and Robert S. Harrison (1978) as a starting point to 
illustrate the affinity between original institutionalism and the concept of systemism as 
summarized and refined in the writings of the eminent philosopher Mario Bunge. Systemism 
thereby puts an emphasis on the relations between individual agents or entities, which constitute 
an aggregate system. Such a relational perspective implies that different ontological levels are 
mutually interdependent, since individuals are always relationally embedded, allowing for the 
whole to influence its parts and for the parts to influence the whole. As a consequence, the 
question of aggregation of individual behavior is seen as an interesting and potentially complicated 
theoretical problem instead of being understood as merely an arithmetic procedure of “summing 
up.” 
This perspective aligns well with the growing research on economic complexity, which 
provides a similar account on aggregation within social systems. While complexity economics is 
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often vague on its epistemological and ontological fundamentals, it has developed a rich toolset of 
formal models tailored to the analysis of complex social systems. We take the writings of Warren 
Weaver (1948) on complexity as a vantage point of showing how complexity aligns with systemism 
and institutional economics. In doing so, we search for potential complementarities between these 
concepts, and how these complementarities might be exploited. In particular, we discuss the 
potential of using agent-based models within institutionalist research. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section two introduces the philosophical concept of 
systemism, and illustrates how it aligns to institutional thought and complexity economics as well 
as possibly provides a unifying framework for these two approaches. Section three tries to develop 
a specific example of the general argument sketched in section two by referring to the use of agent-
based models in institutionalist analysis. Section four contains our conclusions. 
 
 
Systemism, Complexity, and Institutionalist Pattern Modeling1 
 
 
Although the label of systemism might seem novel, the corresponding ideas regarding research 
practice are far from being entirely new. In his various writings on systemism, Mario Bunge 
provides a series of illustrative examples for “systemist” social research. In this context, Bunge gives 
due credit to a series of well-known institutional economists, whom he conceives as systemist 
researchers — in particular, he mentions Gunnar Myrdal (Bunge 2012, 30), Max Weber, Joseph A. 
Schumpeter, Thorstein Veblen, and K. William Kapp  (Bunge 1999, 92-93), as well as John 
Maynard Keynes and Wassily Leontief (Bunge 2004, 187). Bunge’s observation suggests a clear 
affinity between the concept of systemism and institutionalist economics. 
In his account on systemism, Bunge asserts that any object or entity is either “a system or a 
part of one … [whereby] a system is a complex object, every part or component of which is 
connected with other parts of the same object in such a manner that the whole possesses some 
features that its components lack — that is, emergent properties” (Bunge 1996, 20). Hence, he ties 
the concept of a system to the idea of related nodes forming an aggregate with some emergent 
properties. These emergent properties carry mechanisms, whose effects lead to continuous effects 
of change and stabilization, because of which we conceive of them “as a process (or sequence of 
states, or pathway) in a concrete system, natural or social” (Bunge 2004, 186). These mechanisms 
are mostly “concealed,” and thus “have to be conjectured” (Bunge 2004, 186), which constitutes 
an important parallel to the natural sciences. Some mechanisms are “essential” in that they are 
unique to a given system (Bunge 2004, 193), and that they potentially carry “specific” functions 
that may be used to achieve specific goals. While mechanisms can be distinguished from functions 
(the former answer how things work, while the latter show how to achieve a given aim), they can 
still be mapped onto each other. In this context, the function-mechanism relation is principally 
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one-to-many, since different mechanisms can be used to achieve a specific aim. Success on markets, 
for instance, can be achieved through a variety of mechanisms, hence “markets can be conquered” 
on different ways, for example, “by force, dumping, free-trade agreements or even honest 
competition” (Bunge 2004, 194). 
Any system can be characterized by a specific composition (the set of nodes), an environment and 
a certain structure or organization (the collection of relations between the nodes as well as between 
the nodes and the environment). The latter is a novel and necessary element of any system as well 
as the source of emergent properties, hence mechanisms. For instance, the degree distribution of 
the network structure representing scientific communication, which often follows a power-law, is 
intrinsically related to what Robert K. Merton famously termed the “Matthew Effect”, i.e., the 
mechanism allocating prestige to different scientists, which is determined by the relative prestige 
these scientists have accrued in the past (Merton 1968; De Solla Price 1965). Thus, one main 
contribution of systemism from a practical perspective is its capacity of putting the most interesting 
aspect of any system and structures therein — e.g., the organization of relations — at the center 
stage. 
While this basic concept of a system can be applied to a variety of concrete or even conceptual 
items, for the matter at hand, we can explicitly apply it to social systems like a family, a firm, or a 
nation. Therefore, novel properties emerge at the level of the whole system (global properties, such 
as a firm’s success or failure), or at the level of its individual components (relational properties, 
such as the role assigned to a given employee). By focusing on the relations between individuals, 
systemism aims to transgress the traditional dichotomy of individualist and holist approaches, and 
thereby to preserve “the grains of truth” involved in these approaches. Following this argument, 
Bunge juxtaposes systemism to individualism and holism by referring to three different layers: 
ontology, methodology, and morals (Bunge 1996, 2000). Table 1 gives a stylized representation of 
the differences between three distinctive approaches with respect to ontology and methodology, 
which are in the focus of this paper. 
The idea of systemism is not entirely new to institutionalist economics. In their classical 
methodological papers, Myrdal (1978) and Wilber and Harrison (1978) already emphasize both, 
systemism and holism. According to their definitions, the former means that the patterns 
emerging from the joint behavior cannot be derived from analyzing a single agent in isolation, 
while the latter was meant to accentuate the importance of potential downward effects in social 
systems. In this context Bunge’s main contribution to institutional economics is in explicitly 
clarifying the double role of emergent properties in this specific context, which are constituted by 
joint interaction, and thus may carry mechanisms of downward causation. Hence, in Bunge’s 
account of systemism, the complexity introduced by relations may give rise to mechanisms of 
downward causation, thereby rendering the reference to holism superfluous by deriving the 
possibility of downward causation from the original proposition that “parts are so related that their 
functioning is conditioned by their interrelations” (Gruchy 1947, 4). The fact that, for Bunge, 
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social systems and their constituents are inherently dynamic provides another parallel to the classic 
account of Wilber and Harrison (1978), who assign an important role to evolutionary thinking. 
Given this background, it seems fair to say that systemism is an implicit cornerstone of 
institutionalist theorizing and modeling. 
 
Table 1. Individualism, Holism, and Systemism in Comparison  
 Individualism Holism Systemism 
Ontology 
A society is an 
aggregate of persons 
— any super-
individual totalities 
are fictitious. 
A society is a whole, 
transcending its 
members due to 
emergent and 
non-reducible collective 
properties. 
A society is a system 
composed of changing 
subsystems and has global 
properties, both reducible 
and non-reducible. 
Methodology 
Social science is the 
study of the 
individual, and to 
explain a social fact 
amounts to 
explaining individual 
action. 
Social science is the 
study of social wholes 
since only they may 
constitute social facts, 
which, in turn, 
determine individual 
behavior. 
Social science is the study 
of social systems; their 
changing composition, 
environment and 
structure, as well as the 
mechanisms they bring 
forth. 
Source: Based on Bunge (1996, 243-268). 
 
Moreover, a close reading of Wilber and Harrison (1978) also suggests that a high priority was 
given to understanding the relation between different ontological levels of the economy. A similar 
emphasis can also be found in Bunge, who argues that “social sciences study social systems and 
their subsystems and supersystems” (1996, 273). He recognizes that any system carries emergent 
properties as ontological novelties, which may come in two forms: either the system possesses some 
properties that its parts do not possess (global properties), or the parts possess some properties 
exactly because they are part of a given system (relational properties). Therefore, the approach to 
understand emergent properties as ontological novelties is rather a universal take on the question 
of whether “more is different” (Anderson 1972).  
Systemism further posits that different ontological levels in social research — no matter where 
these levels are exactly located in a given application — are bridged by mechanisms (additionally to 
within-level mechanisms), which replace those simple aggregation rules that are exemplified by 
typical formal procedures (e.g., summing up, calculating a mean, classifying, etc.). The question of 
“aggregation” is explicitly tackled as a potentially interesting theoretical problem and not primarily 
as a technical difficulty. Thereby, these “bridging” mechanisms can take the form of agency-
structure relations (i.e., a bottom-up mechanism or upward causation), or structure-agency 
relations (i.e., top-down mechanisms or downward causation).  
Institutionalists have already developed numerous candidates for such bridging mechanisms 
in their (mainly verbal) models, such as, for example, the concept of reconstitutive downward effects 
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(Hodgson 2002, 2006, 2011), or social emulation (Veblen [1899] 2007). The question of whether 
there are more formal tools that can help institutionalists understand aggregation via mechanisms, 
as suggested by systemism, has led to another stream of literature, known as complexity economics. 
This line of research has developed numerous, mainly formal tools that allow for studying the 
economy as a complex system. Although the idea of complexity developed independently from 
systemism and institutionalism, the similarities of the theoretical frameworks are striking. The 
concept of complexity dates back to, at least, 1948, when Weaver made the important distinction 
between simple and complex scientific problems. Simple problems include only very few variables 
and were studied by pre-1900 physics and engineering. All problems, involving living organisms, 
can never fall into this category as they involve many different aspects and interrelated factors that 
can hardly be separated (Weaver 1948, 537-538). Weaver distinguished between organized and 
disorganized complexity. A system consisting of many components shows disorganized complexity if 
some emergent pattern exists because the linear interactions between the different elements 
smooth each other out. The Law of Large Numbers can be interpreted as such an emergent 
pattern. Econometric work generally assumes this kind of complexity when it takes error terms to 
be identically and independently distributed. By contrast, a system showing organized complexity 
exhibits patterns that emerge because the interactions of the different elements do not smooth each 
other out (i.e., are non-linear). In such a case, there is a kind of self-organization of the system, so 
that the factors are interrelated into an organic whole (Weaver 1948, 539). 
While the analytical models of neoclassical economics presume the economy to show 
disorganized complexity, the perspective of institutionalist modeling expects the economy to be 
characterized by organized complexity. The strong theoretical affinity between the complexity 
approach to the economy and the perspective of insitutionalism/systemism suggests numerous 
potential complementarities. In particular, institutionalists might find some of the formal tools of 
complexity economics adequate to enhance the generality and the rigor of their verbal pattern 
models. On the other hand, complexity economics is a very diverse field that lacks a general 
epistemological and methodological foundation. In this context, systemism might provide both 
accounts with a common philosophical framework and a general platform for the discussion and 
development of theoretical arguments.  
In the next section, we assess the potential of one particular tool, often related to complexity 
economics — agent based modeling. We do this in order to enhance and complement institutional 
pattern modeling aiming to gain a deeper understanding of the systemic properties of complex 
economic and social systems. 
 
Systemic Analysis: A Plea for Agent-Based Models in Economics 
Agent-Based Models (ABMs) are usually expressed via a programming language and aim to 
represent situations, where individual actions lead to patterns, which, in turn, reflect on individual 
behavior. One can conduct artificial experiments by changing an aspect of the model, and then 
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study how this affects the dynamics of the system under observation. While ABMs are considered 
to be formal models, they differ from the strict analytical framework of conventional economics as 
the modeler is not forced to make assumptions in such a way that the system stays analytically 
tractable and exhibits a clear equilibrium. Because the models are solved computationally, 
assumptions can be made on entirely proper considerations. In particular, agents’ behavior does 
not have to be represented via convenient equations, but agents are more intuitively specified by 
attributes and rules implemented in a certain programming language. Such a specification of the 
agents allows the natural implementation of heuristics, learning behavior, and habits into the 
methods of the agent objects. 
The social embeddedness of agents is considered through an underlying — possibly changing — 
graph that specifies the neighborhood of an agent, i.e., the set of agents it can interact with. 
Depending on the degree of realism implemented in crafting the model, such a graph could 
represent a simple grid or an actual interaction structure among the agents. The advantages, in 
contrast to conventional economics, are twofold: First, there is a greater degree of freedom 
regarding the specification of individual behavior. Second, the interdependence of the economic 
agents is taken into account, so that group formation and dynamic power relations among agents 
can be explicitly modeled. Both aspects, in turn, allow for introducing more realism in economic 
modeling. 
Because agents’ rules may not only consider the current state of an agent, but also that of 
other single agents, a group of agents, or the state of the system as a whole, the interdependence of 
different ontological levels can be directly implemented in an ABM. Another particular feature of 
ABMs, in comparison with analytical models, is that they refrain from assumptions about fictitious 
central planning mechanisms, such as the Walrasian auctioneer. Consequently, they allow the 
study of the economy as a self-organizing system without central control. The overall dynamics is then 
truly the result of the interactions of its constituent parts and the interplay of different ontological 
levels. 
The resulting models are very diverse. There are ABMs that aim to be as realistic as possible 
and are extremely complex, while others try to illustrate a certain mechanism or a combination of 
mechanisms and remain rather abstract. Not all potential ABMs are compatible with 
institutionalist methodology and theory and, in most cases, the ABMs are only one piece of a 
broader institutionalist analysis of the problem at hand. Nonetheless, the following example 
illustrates what institutionalist ABMs could look like, and what role they can play in a broader 
analysis. 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Thorbjorn Knudson (2004) use an ABM to illustrate the 
importance of habit formation for the emergence of social conventions in a setting, where 
reconstitutive downward effect plays an important role and the different ontological levels of the 
system under investigation are strongly interrelated. The authors study the emergence and 
evolution of a simple traffic convention, where agents drive cars on a ring structure — half of them 
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clockwise, the other half anti-clockwise. At every round, each driver has to decide whether he/she 
wants to drive on the right or on the left. The authors clarify that the experimentation with 
different decision rules in their ABM helped them identify a surprisingly easy, but very effective 
decision procedure (Hodgson and Knudson 2004, 23). That is, drivers develop a habit of driving 
either on the left or right side and the model shows how the presence of habit fosters a 
convergence to a drive-left or drive-right convention. The model also shows that habit formation 
alone is not sufficient for the emergence of the convention, but has to be supplemented by a 
selection mechanism to lead to a stable traffic rule. Due to the modular structure of their ABM, 
Hodgson and Knudson (2004) were also able to study what happens if habit is substituted by 
inertia, which resulted in less convergence in terms of traffic rules. Based on these findings, they 
conclude that the functioning of institutions is best interpreted as influencing habits rather than 
behavior or preferences. This application illustrates how ABM can be used to study different 
mechanism and their mutual influences on each other in one coherent model. Other recent 
examples of papers that successfully make use of ABM to implement an institutional pattern 
model include the following: Wolfram Elsner and Torsten Heinrich (2009), who focus on the 
meso-level of the economy, use an ABM to study the group sizes and agency mechanisms that 
foster cooperative behavior among agents and use their findings to provide a model-based rationale 
for the existence of a “variety of capitalism” (Peter Hall and John Soskice 2001). Bernhard Rengs 
and Manuel Wäckerle (2014) build an extensive ABM of the European Monetary Union. They 
include fundamental institutionalist concepts such as conspicuous consumption in a model that 
represents both the real and the financial sector of several countries, including their political 
institutions, and allows for a dynamic analysis of different institutional settings. Manuel Wäckerle, 
Bernhard Rengs, and Wolfgang Radax (2014) illustrate the impact of trust and leadership on the 
life cycles of social institutions. Compared to classical game theoretic contributions, their agent-
based framework allows them to study the interplay of agency and social structure more explicitly. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We argued that institutionalists can benefit greatly both from the philosophical framework of 
systemism and the application of ABMs as one possible operationalization of this general 
framework. In some classic methodological research, institutionalist authors identified holism, 
systemism, and evolution as the cornerstones of institutionalist analysis. Bunge’s concept of 
systemism ties together all these ideas in one coherent framework, labeled systemism. We tried to 
show that this systemist perspective on the economy aligns well with a conception of the economy 
as a complex system. Building upon the definition of organized complexity due to Weaver (1948), 
we argued that there are considerable complementarities between complexity economics and 
original institutionalism, which are easily accessed from a systemist viewpoint. Finally, we 
illustrated our claims by referring to a simple ABM (Hodgson and Knudsen 2004), which 
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incorporates some of these complementary aspects. The above said, of course, does not meant that 
ABMs substitute a broader analysis, but have to be embedded into an adequate institutionalist 
process story in order to get epistemic meaningfulness. 
 
A Footnote-to-be 
 
1 The first part of this section draws on Jakob Kapeller (forthcoming). 
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